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The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976) 
In Boyd v. United States,1 the Supreme Court held that the 
fourth2 and fifth3 amendments create a zone of privacy encompassing 
an individual's person and property.4 The government, according to 
Boyd,5 cannot enter this zone, either by compelling an individual 
to testify against himself or by subpoenaing or seizing his books 
and papers for use as evidence against hiin in a criminal or quasi-
criminal0 proceeding. The Court found an "intimate relation"7 
between the two amendments such that the search and seizure of 
books and papers may be "unreasonable" even if conducted pursuant 
to a court order. 
Over time, both societal and judicial notions of property and pri-
vacy have changed dramatically. In addition, varying public reac-
tions to the proble~ of crime in the United States have been 
paralleled by shifting judicial views on the limitations on the govern-
ment's constitutional power to apprehend and prosecute criminal sus-
pects. These trends have been reflected in the gradual erosion of 
the "intimate relation" doctrine and the elimination of the protection 
that Boyd afforded to individual liberty. During the October Term, 
1975, the Supreme Court accelerated this process when it all but 
overruled that landmark decision. This Note will trace these trends 
and examine the demise of Boyd. 
I. THE PROTECTIONIST ERA: Boyd AND Gouled 
Boyd and Gouled v. United States8 combined to build a nearly 
impenetrable barrier between the government and an individual's 
property. In Boyd, a forfeiture proceeding under the customs rev-
enue law, the United States claimed that Boyd and Sons, a partner-
!. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef• 
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War• 
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
3. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself . • . ." 
4. See text at notes 22-24 infra. 
5. The Boyd holding became applicable to the states as a result of Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
6. A quasi-criminal proceeding is an action, like the forfeiture proceeding in-
volved in Boyd, whose "object . . . is to penalize for the commission of an offense 
against the law." One 1958 · Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 
(1965). Henceforth, this Note will not distinguish between criminal and quasi-crimi-
nal proceedings unless the context so requires. 
7. 116 U.S. at 633. 
8. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
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ship, had fraudulently evaded paying taxes on thirty-five cartons of 
imported plate glass. The statutory penalty for fraudulent nonpay-
ment of the tariff was the forfeiture of the goods involved. Accord-
ingly, the government seized the glass and instituted forfeiture proceed- . 
ings against it. During this proceeding, the government obtained a 
co1:1rt order directing Boyd and Sons to produce an invoice that 
allegedly contained proof that they were guilty as charged. 
The statute pursuant to which the order was issued provided that 
failure to comply with the order would be treated as a confession of the 
allegations set forth in the government's petition. The Boyds com- · 
plied under protest, arguing that both the order and the statute au-
thorizing it were unconstitutional. A unanimous Supreme Court 
agreed with this contention. Because of the penalty for noncompli-
ance, the Court held that the statute violated the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
. But the seven Justices subscribing to the opinion of the Court 
went further. Speaking through Justice Bradley, they held that the 
seizure of documents is inherently "unreasonable" within the mean-
ing of the first clause of the fourth amendment-the "unreasonable 
'search clause"-whenever the government's sole claim to them is 
based on their possible utility as evidence in a criminal proceeding9 
against the individual who both owns and possesses them. Further, 
the majority of the Court held that, on the facts of this case, a "sei-
zure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment had taken 
place.1° Finally, the majority held that the fifth amendment barred 
the admission of the evidence that had been seized in violation of 
the fourth amendment prohibition against "unreasonable" seizures. 
Reflection both upon the state of the law of search and seizure 
in England at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights and upon 
9. This was the essence of the mere evidence rule, which provided that the fourth 
amendment permitted searches and seizures only if the government had a superior 
claim of title to the objects seized. Boyd drew the distinction between constitution-
ally permissible searches and seizures and those for mere evidence as follows: 
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties 
and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from 
a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose 
of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against 
him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government is 
entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not. 
116 U.S. at 623. As applied to documents, this will henceforth be referred to as 
the Boyd or paper-search rule. See 116 U.S. at 629. As applied to all of an indi-
vidual's possessions, including documents, it will be referred to as the Gouled or mere 
evidence rule. See text at notes 25-32 infra. 
10. Boyd did not involve a traditional search and seizure conducted pursuant to 
a search warrant; rather, it involved a statutorily authorized court order requiring the 
production of an invoice for imported goods. The invoice was introduced into evi-
dence in the forfeiture trial. The Court held that this compulsory production was 
tantamount to a search and seizure and, as such, fell within the scope of .the fourth 
amendment. 116 U.S. at 621-22. 
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the framers' personal familiarity with abuses of the warrant power 
led the Boyd majority to decide that the unreasonable search clause 
was not merely an empty preamble to the second clause of the fourth 
amendment, the "warrant clause." Although the majority read the 
warrant clause as merely providing certain procedural safeguards 
against arbitrary governmental intrusion into a person's life, the un-
reasonable search clause was construed as declaring that one's per-
sonal effects were entirely immune from governmental invasion.11 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Bradley relied primarily on 
Entick v. Carrington,12 the English case that he believed had exer-
cised a decisive influence upon the shaping of the fourth and fifth 
amendments. In that case, Lord Camden invalidated a "paper 
search" conducted under the authority of a technically valid warrant. 
He marshaled two arguments in defense of his holding. First, he 
asserted that a seizure was pennissible-i.e., nontrespassory-only 
when carried out by a party with a superior property right in the 
thing seized. The right to reclaim property was similarly condi-
tioned upon the establishment of superior title. Thus, allowing the 
seizure of mere evidence would deprive the accused of a possession 
that was rightfully his, a result that would be manifestly unjust. Sec-
ond, Lord Camden argued that, when the evidence sought was an 
individual's private papers, the search and seizure were particularly 
offensive, both because "[p]apers are ... his dearest property; and 
are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an 
inspection,"13 and because upholding this procedure would be the 
equivalent of compelling him to testify against himself.14 
In order to apply the fourth amendment to the factual situation 
in Boyd, Justice Bradley had to interpret "search and seizure" as 
11. S~e N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND· 
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1970). 
12. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765). 
13. 19 Howell's State Trials at 1066. 
14. Lord Camden observed: 
There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has often been tried, but 
never prevailed. Nay, where the adversary has by force or fraud got possession 
of your own proper evidence, there is no way to get it back but by action. 
In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet there 
are some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, robbery, and house-breaking, 
to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more atrocious than libelling. 
But our law has provided no paper-search in these cases to help forward the 
conviction. 
Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, 
or from a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the 
innocent than useful to the public, I will not say. 
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because 
the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent 
as wel] as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would seem, that 
search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then, too, the inno-
cent would be confounded with the guilty. 
19 Howell's State Trials at 1073. 
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including the compulsory production of documents.15 Arguing that 
the theoretical foundation of the unreasonable search clause com-
manded such a reading of its text, he again turned to Entick: 
The principles laid down in this opinion [Entick] affect the very 
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther 
than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its 
adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part 
of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home 
and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and 
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the of-
fense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal secu-
rity, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never 
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,-it is the 
invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the es-
sence of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and open-
ing boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any 
forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of 
his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime 
or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. 
In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into 
each other.16 
Although conceding that this interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment did not accord with a literal reading of the amendment, he 
defended it with great vigor: 
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggra-
vating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, -as before said, it 
contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial pur-
pose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and 
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices 
get their first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be 
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property should be liberally construed. · A 
close and literal construction of them deprives them of halt their ef-
ficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted 
more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watch-
ful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and guard against any 
stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta princi-
piis.11 
Finally, the Court ruled that the fifth amendment barred the ad-
mission of papers seized as mere evidence for the purpose of either 
15. It was not self-evident that the compulsory production of the invoice autho• 
rized by the statute fell within the meaning of "search and seizure." The government 
did not remove the invoice from the Boyds' possession. Rather, it requested, and 
the Court ordered, that the Boyds produce the invoice and allow the government's 
attorneys to examine it and show it to the jury in their presence. See note 10 supra. 
16. 116 U.S. at 630. 
17. 116 U.S. at 635. 
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convicting their owner-possessor of a crime or obtaining a forfeiture 
of his goods. Justice Bradley commented: 
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two 
amendments. They throw great light on each other. For the "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment 
are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give 
evidence against himself, which is condemned in the Fifth Amend-
ment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness 
against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, 
throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search 
• and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And 
we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private 
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially 
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. We 
think it is within the clear intent and meaning of those terms.18 
Thus, the Court held that the seizure of the invoice 'Violated the Boyds' 
rights under the fourth amendment and that its use as evidence 
against them violated their fifth amendment rights. 
Justice Bradley offered no positive definition of "the indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property"10 
that he considered to be at the core of the intimate relation between 
the two amendments. It is clear, however, that confidentiality was 
not the interest that the Court sought to protect. Whether the Boyds 
had kept the invoice a secret to the world or whether they had made 
its contents a matter of public knowledge was irrelevant; either way, 
the government's action was illegal. But, perhaps because the opin-
ion was couched in such sweeping language, the positive nature of 
the fundamental right was unclear. 
Later courts20 interpreted Boyd as identifying the privilege 
against self-incrimination as the concept at the heart of the intimate 
relation. Viewing an individual's papers as an extension of his 
"self," adherents of this view treated the unreasonable search clause 
of the fourth amendment as an extension of the fifth amendment. 
On this theory, the amendments, taken together, define the ultimate 
scope of each person's right not to be compelled to serve as the 
source of evidence against himself. 
But this guarantee that a person's papers are free from official 
18. 116 U.S. at 633. 
19. 116 U.S. at 630. 
20. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), discussed in text 
at notes 52-56 infra; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
In holding that an individual who has been granted immunity may be compelled 
to testify against himself, the majority in Brown must have concluded that Boyd had 
been solely concerned with protecting the individual from compelled self-incrimina-
tion. The four dissenting Justices, on the other hand, cited Boyd in support of the 
proposition that, because the Constitution grants the individual an absolute right 
to remain silent, testimony compelled under a grant of immunity is subject to con-
stitutional attack. 
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inspection was absolute only in theory. The 'Boyd majority had to 
reconcile its doctrine with traditional practices. Historically, the gov-
ernment had been allowed to require recordkeeping with regard 
to certain goods, such as those subject to duties, in which it had some 
property interest, and those records had always been deemed seiz-
able. 21 The Court in Boyd incorporated this tradition into its consti-
tutional theory by proclaiming the seizure of documents to be inher-
ently unconstitutional only when they were taken as mere evidence 
and by granting that, on the basis of its property interest in such 
goods, the government had a superior right to the corresponding rec-
ords. 22 Because any such record did not truly belong to the accused, 
it could not be viewed as an extension of his "self''; thus, its use 
against him did not constitute a compelled self-incrimination. This • 
accommodation to tradition did not seem to compromise the general 
paper-search rule significantly.· The rule attached to all documents 
in an individual's possession to which he had a superior claim of 
right. 23 Consequently, although it was not viewed as having been 
designed to protect property rights per se, 24 the scope of the privi-
lege embodied in the unreasonable search clause came to be defined 
in terms of the law of property. In that respect, the doctrine con-
tained the seeds of its own destruction. 
Thirty-five years later, in Gouled v. United States,25 the Boyd 
holding was reaffirmed and applied to a traditional search and sei-
zure conducted pursuant to a facially valid search warrant. 26 At 
Gouled's trial on charges of mail fraud, 27 various documents had 
been admitted over his objections. Justice Clarke, writing for the 
Court, held that, because the papers seized belonged to Gouled, their 
seizure violated his fourth amendment rights irrespective of whether it 
21. Apparently the invoice sought by the government in Boyd was not a re-
quired record. 
22. 116 U.S. at 622-24. 
23. The Court did not directly address the question of whether the privilege 
would apply to papers owned by the accused, but in another person's custody. See 
text at notes 105-07 (discussing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 ( 1973) ). 
24. However, the rule was fully consistent with the prevailing social theory, 
· which had been well stated by Lord Camden a century and a half earlier in En tick 
v. Carrington: 
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property. 
That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all 'instances, where it has 
not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the 
whole. . . . By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be 
it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground 
without my licence, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be 
nothing. 
19 Howell's State Trials at 1066. 
25. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
26. Some documents had been seized pursuant to a warrant; another had been 
obtained by stealth. 255 U.S. at 303. 
27. Gouled was convicted for conspiring to defraud the United States (Fed. 
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was accomplished pursuant to a warrant. 28 Moreover, because that 
seizure rendered him "the unwilling source of the evidence,"20 admis-
sion of that evidence violated his fifth amendment rights. 30 
At the end of his opinion, Justice Clarke observed that "[t]here 
is no special sanctity in papers"31 that should cause them to be re-
garded differently from other types of personal property. This pass-
ing remark, which was not without support in Boyd,82 reflected the 
common-sense judgment that, if the government's appropriation of 
an individual's documents as mere evidence is wrongful because it 
makes him "the unwilling source" of incriminating evidence, the 
same must be true of the seizure of any of his other possessions. 
Its effect, however, was to transform the paper-search rule of Boyd 
into a broader rule under which the search for or seizure of any 
item as "mere evidence" was proscribed. In this roundabout way, 
the fourth amendment in fact became the protector of privacy. 
JI. THE RETREAT FROM ABSOLUTISM 
By defining the unreasonable search clause in terms of a prop-
erty-interest theory, the Court in Boyd hoped to develop a doctrine 
that would provide the maximum possible protection for the indi-
vidual consistent with certain traditionally accepted practices. On 
the one hand, the rule condoned attachment, sequestration, or exe-
cution pursuant to a judicial writ, as well as seizure of goods that 
were contraband, 33 stolen, forfeited, or liable to duties, 34 because 
Crim. Code, ch. 321, § 37, 35 Stat. 1096 (1909)) and for using the mails to pro-
mote a scheme to defraud the United States (Fed. Crim. Code, ch. 321, § 215, 
35 Stat. 1130 (1909)). 
28. The Court could have disposed of the case on the ground that the Espionage 
Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, 40 Stat. 217, 228, pursuant to which the warrant was 
issued, did not authorize the seizure of mere evidence. Instead, the Court took the 
opportunity to review the broad holding of Boyd. 
29. 255 U.S. at 306. 
30. The Court wholeheartedly endorsed the spirit underlying Justice Bradley's 
view in Boyd. Justice Clarke declared: 
It would not be possible to add to the emphasis with which the Framers of our 
Constitution and this Court . . . have declared the importance to political liberty 
and the welfare of our country of the due observance of the rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution by these two Amendments. The effect of the decisions 
cited is: that such rights are declared to be indispensable to the "full enjoyment 
of personal security, personal liberty and private property;" that they are to be 
regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty. 
255 U.S. at 303-04. 
31. 255 U.S. at 309. 
32. See 116 U.S. at 623-24. 
33. An individual cannot legally own contraband; thus, the government's title 
therein must be superior to the individual's. 
34. Thus, the traditionally accepted practice of governmental seizure of records 
required by law to be kept in regard to goods liable to duties was also permissible. 
See text at note 22 supra. 
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they involved the seizure of property to which the government's 
claim of title was superior to that of the individual from whom it 
was seized. On the other hand, the Court placed such a premium 
on the interest at the core of. the "intimate relation" that Boyd and 
Gouled were infused with the unspoken judgment that the class of 
cases in which the government would be deemed to have a superior 
property right was fixed eternally by the common law of 1791. No 
~ place existed in this scheme for any "development" of the mere evi-
dence rule, since that would entail a reduction in the scope of that 
fundamental interest. 
However, over the years, the Court grew increasingly dissatisfied 
with interpreting the unreasonable search clause in terms of property 
interests. This dissatisfaction had several possible sources. Tra-
ditional views of the sanctity of property were quickly giving way 
to the demand for increasing governmental control over its owner-
ship, use, and disposition. The view that a fundamental right to pri-
vacy exists, espoused in the famous article by Brandeis and War-
ren, 35 was gaining acceptance. This concept was defined in terms 
of a basic right "to be left alone,"36 rather than in terms of the tech-
nicalities of English property law. Finally, perhaps the Court simply 
was not content with the results that would have been entailed by 
strict adherence to the mere evide~ce rule as it had been pro-
pounded in Boyd and expanded by Gouled. 
Where strict adherence would not interfere with governmental 
regulation of economic activity, the rule was duly applied. Johnson 
v. United States,37 which involved an indictment of a bankrupt for 
fraudulent concealment of funds from the trustee in bankruptcy, is 
illustrative. The defendant claimed that the fifth amendment privi-
lege precluded the admission into evidence of his financial records, 
which had been transferred to the trustee against his will. The 
Court held, consistent with Boyd, that the subpoena could be en-
forced because title to the records had passed to the trustee when 
bankruptcy was declared. 
Where the mere evidence rule interfered with governmental 
regulation of economic activity, however, it was modified or "re-
fined." In a group of cases involving subpoenas directed to pusiness 
organizations, the Court refused to include such associations within 
the class of entities protected by the fifth amendment privilege. In 
Hale v. Henkel,38 the Court held that the privilege does not apply 
35. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAR.v. L. REv. 193 (1890). 
36. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
37. 228 U.S. 257 (1913). 
38. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
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to corporations. Thus, an agent cannot refuse to answer questions 
or to comply with a subpoena duces tecum89 on the ground that the 
corporation might be incriminated. Moreover, because the docu-
ments are in the custody of and are being subpoenaed from the cor-
porate entity rather than from the agent, the agent cannot refuse 
to comply on the ground that compliance might incriminate him. 40 
Possibly Hale can be reconciled with the mere evidence rule on 
the ,theory that somehow the government has a quasi-property right to 
corporate records because of the unique historical relationship be-
tween the corporation and the state.41 But such a theory cannot ex-
plain the result in United States v. White.42 In that case, the Court 
held that the fifth amendment does not shield any collective entity, 
whether incorporated or not, from a subpoena duces tecum so long 
as the organization has an existence independent of and distinct from 
that of its individual members. Without addressing the previously 
paramount question of who had superior title to the documents, the 
Court justified its holding merely on the policy ground that a contrary 
result would severely hinder the government's attempts to regulate 
commerce. 
Of the decisions that considered Boyd during this period of re-
treat, perhaps Shapiro v. United States43 had the greatest impact on 
the individual's ability to shield the details of his life from the gov-
ernment. In that case the Court enunciated the "required records" 
doctrine, under which no person can invoke the fourth or fifth 
amendment to justify refusal to comply with a facially valid subpoena 
compelling the production of records that the person is legally re-
quired to keep. This decision represented a complete rejection of 
the fundamental limitations that the Court in Boyd had placed on 
the government's power to compel the production of records kept 
pursuant to its command. The Court in effect recognized the power 
39. The order involved in the Boyd case differed from a subpoena duces tecum 
only in the penalty imposed for noncompliance. Hale held that the paper-search rule 
enunciated in Boyd applied as well to subpoenas duces tecum. 
40. In Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), the writ was directed to 
the corporation. In Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911), it was directed 
to the agent. In both cases the Court held that the self-incrimination clause did not 
allow the agent to refuse to comply with the subpoena. It was later held, however, 
that the custodian of an organization's "missing" documents can refuse to answer 
questions about their whereabouts when to do so would incriminate him. Curcio v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957~. 
4'1. Traditionally the state has exercised special powers over corporations, such 
as the right of visitation. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89 (1974); Hale 
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 75. 
42. 322 U.S. 694 (1944). 
43. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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of the legislature to acquire any and all information it wants from 
an individual. 44 
The Court also narrowed the scope of the protection provided 
by the mere evidence rule in Marron v. United States.45 In that 
case the Court distinguished between property that is merely evi-
dence of a crime and property used in the commission of a _crime. 46 
· Whereas Gouled had allowed the seizure of an instrumentality of 
a crime only insofar as it was contraband, Marron allowed the seizure 
of any such instrumentality. Because even papers can be charac-
terized as instrumentalities of crime, 47 Marron represented a serious 
threat to the zone of protection established by Boyd and broadened 
by Gouled. 48 
ill. THE PRIVACY REVOLUTION 
\ 
A. The Beginning 
To the extent that the decisions following Boyd and Gouled re-
duced the obstacles to governmental seizure of an individual's prop-
erty, they also narrowed his effective zone of privacy. A conflict 
arose within the Court over this development. Although the dispute 
concerned the fundamental nature of the rights protected by the 
fourth and fifth amendments, it took the form of a debate over 
the "real" meaning of Boyd. On the one hand, proponents of 
the traditional interpretation of Boyd believed that the core of the 
"intimate relation" between the amendments was the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Since the key question to these Justices was 
whether the evidence belonged to the defendant, they found the gov-
ernment's increasing power to intrude into the life of the individual 
44. Congress eventually exercised this authority to require the keeping of records 
to aid its fight against crime, as well as its regulation of economic activity. On the 
basis of this "required records" doctrine, the Court has sanctioned congressional en-
actments that have intruded substantially upon personal privacy. See United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 447 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); California Bankers Assn. 
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 93 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Grosso v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). 
45. 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
46. The Court in Marron did not attempt to explain its holding in terms of a 
superior title theory. A possible rationale for the decision is that, by using an object 
to commit a crime, the criminal has forfeited it to the state. 
47. In Marron, the Court treated records maintained in an establishment where 
liquor was sold as instrumentalities. Gouled had also recognized that papers might 
be used as instrumentalities of crime. See 255 U.S. at 309. 
48. For a discussion of the ingenuity of prosecutors in characteijzing different 
types of property as instrumentalities, see Comment, The Search and Seizure of Pri-
vate Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Considerations, 6 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 274, 
282-83 (1973). 
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to be constitutionally permissible so long as the exercise of that 
power was consistent with the rules of property law. On the other 
hand, advocates of a revisionist interpretation of Boyd argued that 
the true concern of the framers of the fourth and fifth amendments 
was the protection of a fundamental right of privacy. 40 
The latter position made its debut in the bizarre case of Perlman 
v. United Stat_es.50 Perlman had introduced his own documents into 
evidence in a successful patent infringement suit. His company then 
instituted similar proceedings against another defendant, and he 
again introduced the papers into evidence in connection with his own 
testimony. A dismissal without prejudice was granted on the condi-
tion that the documents be left in the court's custody. Later, when 
Perlman was charged with perjury in connection with testimony that 
he had given in regard to the exhibits, the United States attorney 
moved to obtain possession of these items for use before a grand 
jury. When Perlman learned that his attorney had failed to object 
to this motion, he sought to enjoin the United States attorney from 
taking possession of the documents, which were undeniably his own 
property, on the basis of the mere evidence rule. The Supreme 
Court's decision to affirm the denial of the injunction appears to have 
been based at least in part on the novel proposition that, by publi-
cizing the documents through their introduction into the court rec-
ord, Perlman had forfeited his right to object to their seizure and 
use against him. To some extent, then, the Court's emphasis was 
on the lack of intrusion upon Perlman's privacy. 51 
This revisionist interpretation of the "intimate relation" first ap-
peared as a fully articulated doctrine in Justice Brandeis' dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States.52 That case concerned the applicability 
of the fourth amendment to warrantless wiretapping by government 
agents. The majority, which was as eager to facilitate the govern-
ment's efforts to combat crime as it had been a year earlier in Mar-
49. See note 72 infra. 
50. 247 U.S. 7 (1918). 
51. The Court also seemed to base its decision on the fact that Perlman had vol-
untarily yielded custody of the papers to the district court. It suggested that the 
privilege recognized in Boyd applied only to papers owned by, and in the possession 
of, the accused. See 241 U.S. at 14-15. Dictum in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S • 
.465 (1921), from which Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, stated that the 
fourth and fifth amendments are not necessarily offended when documents owned by 
the accused are seized by the state while in the custody of a third party. This propo-
sition lay dormant until its formal adoption by the Court in Couch v. United States, 
409 U.S. 322 (1973). See text at notes 101-07 infra. But cf. Ex parte Jackson, 
96 U.S. 727 (1877) (dictum disallowing warrantless seizure of a defendant's property 
in the possession of the Postal Service). 
S2. 277 l,J.S. 438 (1928), 
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-
ron, analyzed the issue in terms of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, 53 whose parameters were determined by property law. Find-
ing that speech is not property within the context of the fourth 
amendment, they concluded that . wiretapping infringed upon an 
interest protected by the fourth amendment, and thereby the fifth, 
only if it involved trespassing upon the accused's tangible property. 
Justice Brandeis' dissent, however, argued that the majority opinion 
was based on the false premise that the fourth amendment had been 
designed either to perpetuate antiquated notions of English property 
law or to bolster the privilege against self-incrimination. 54 In Justice 
Brandeis' view, at the heart of Entick, Boyd, and Gouled was the 
premise that the amendment had been designed to protect a funda-
mental "right to be left alone": 55 
Every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the private 
life of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as eviqence 
in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must 
be deemed a violation of the Fifth. 56 
Although Justice Brandeis had lost the battle in Olmstead, by 
the second half of the twentieth century he had won the war. The 
theory that his dissenting opinion espoused eventually became the 
official position of the Court. 57 Moreover, during this period it be-
came ~clear that the mere evidence rule had outlived its usefulness. 
The criteria for determining whether an object was immune from 
seizure had become so structured that the rule no longer served as 
a bulwark for the privilege against self-incrimination. Furthermore, 
the rule was at odds with public opinion, as it frustrated the popular 
demand for law and order that was increasing along with the crime 
rate. 
Although Justice Brandeis had identified the right of privacy as 
the basic interest to be protected, he had indicated neither the man-
ner in which this protection would be ensured nor the extent to 
which the law derived from Boyd would have to be repudiated. The 
Court undertook this task in three cases decided three decades after 
53. See 277 U.S. at 462-63. 
54. Justice Brandeis advocated a privacy rationale for the fifth amendment, also. 
See text at note 56 infra. 
55. 277 U.S. at 478. 
56. 277 U.S. at 478-79. 
57. Regarding the fourth amendment, see, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 
(1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police .•. 
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment."). Regarding the fifth amendment, see, 
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The Fifth Amendment in 
its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which 
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment."). 
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Olmstead: Schmerber v. California,U8 Warden v. Hayden/'0 and 
Katz v. United States.60 
B. The Decisive Steps: Schmerber, Hayden, Katz 
The consequences of redefining the fourth and fifth amendments 
became clear in the mid-1960s. In Schmerber v. California, the 
Court established that the fifth amendment privilege and,. by implica-
tion, the unreasonable search clause, protects the individual only 
against the seizure of "testimonial" or "communicative" evidence. 
Next, in Warden v. Hayden, it repudiated the rationale of Gouled, 
holding that there is no constitutionally significant distinction be-
tween mere evidence, on the one hand, and instrumentalities, contra-
band, and fruits of crime, on the other. Searches and seizures of 
the former would no longer be unreasonable per se. However, Hay-
den left open the possibility that "testimonial" or "communicative" 
evidence would still receive absolute protection, and thus it did not 
disturb the "intimate relation" doctrine propounded by Boyd. But 
then, in Katz v. United States, the Court intimated that it was ready 
to discard the concept of the "intimate relation" entirely. 
Schmerber marked the first stage in the Court's rethinking of 
the Boyd doctrine. The defendant in that case was hospitalized for 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Having detected liquor 
on his breath at the scene of the accident, a police officer arrested 
Schmerber at the hospital and directed a doctor to take a sample 
of his blood. The sample was taken over Schmerber's objections 
and was subjected to tests that indicated that he had been intoxicated 
while driving. The test results were introduced into evidence over 
Schmerber's objections, and he was convicted of drunk driving. 
By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Per-
haps the most striking aspect of the Court's opinion, written 
by Justice Brennan, was the manner in which"it dealt with the fourth 
and fifth amendment questions. 61 The traditional approach would 
have begun with an inquiry into whether the seizure62 of Schmerber's 
blood had violated the mere evidence rule. Upon reaching the con-
clusion that it had ( which could not be doubted since the state had 
no proprietary interest in his blood), the Court would have simply 
58. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
59. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
60. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
61. In addition to the fourth and fifth amendment arguments discussed in the 
text, Schmerber objected to the introduction of the evidence on due process and sixth 
amendment grounds. The Supreme Court sustained the state courts' rulings against 
him on these claims as well. 
62. The Court determined that taking a blood sample was a "seizure" within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment. 384 U.S. at 767. 
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declared, citing Gouled, that the seizure was in contravention of 
the fourth amendment and that the use of the test results as evi-
dence in the trial was repugnant to the filth amendment. 
But Justice Brennan approached the problem differently. At the 
core of his analysis was the judgment that Boyd and Gouled were 
"not instructive in this context."63 This thinly veiled renunciation 
of those cases was not surprising, since the Court now professed to 
believe that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment 
is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intru-
sion by the State."64 What was unexpected, however, was that Jus-
tice Brennan replaced the traditional property-oriented approach to 
the "intimate relation" with an analysis grounded on a new interpre-
tation of the fifth amendment, rather than on the right to privacy. 
As Justice Black pointed· out in his dissent in Schmerber, Justice 
Bradley's majority opinion in Boyd had advocated a liberal construc-
tion of the fourth and fifth amendments in order to secure the fullest 
possible protection of individual rights.65 But Justice Brennan now 
read the fifth amendment as protecting Jess than the whole "complex 
of values it helps to protect."66 Thus, while Justice Clarke for the 
Court in Gouied 'had believed that compelling an individual to sub-
mit to the seizure of any of his property so that it might be used 
against him in a criminal proceeding was to compel him to be a wit-
ness against himself within the meaning of the fifth amendment, J us-
tice Brennan was willing to hold the fifth amendment applicable in 
such settings only when the property was testimonial or communica-
tive. 67 
By distinguishing between "testimonial" or "communicative" evi-
dence on the one hand and "real" evidence on the other, Justice 
Brennan was _able to uphold such traditional police practices as com-
pelling suspects to submit to fingerprinting or to produce handwriting 
or voice exemplars. 68 But, in s.o doing, he was fo~ced to recognize -
63. 384 U.S. at 768. See note 70 infra. 
64. 384 U.S. at 767. . 
65. 384 U.S .. at 776-77. Justice Black supported the Boyd Court on this point, 
in striking contrast to the strict literalism for which he was so famous. See, e.g., 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in which he refused to treat eavesdrop-
ping as a search and seizure: 
[l]f they [the framers of the Constitution] had desired to outlaw or restrict the 
use of eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate lan-
guage to do so in the Fourth Amendment. They certainly would not have left 
such a task to the ingenuity of language-stretching judges. 
389 U.S. 366 (dissenting opinion). 
66. 384 U.S. at 762. 
67. 384 U.S. at 764. 
68. Ultimately, the Court did pass on the constitutionality of compelling the pro-
duction of voice and handwriting exemplars. ifn United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218 (1967) (production of voice exemplar requireq. at lineup), and Gilbert v. Cal-
ifornia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar used at trial), both 5-4 deci-
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the privileged status of papers, which the Court in Gouled had ex-
pressly refused to do. As Justice Black pointed out in his Schmerber 
dissent, "[i]t is a strange hierarchy of values that allows the state to 
extract a human being's blood to convict him because of the blood's 
content but proscribes compelled production of his lifeless papers."00 
Nonetheless; this was the "hierarchy of values" that Justice Bren-
nan adopted in upholding Schmerber's conviction. Because the de-
fendant's blood was "real" evidence, its use at his trial did not vio-
late the fifth amendment. Neither did its seizure violate the fourth 
amendment. But Justice Brennan did not explain how this latter 
conclusion followed from the fact that the blood was not "testi-
monial" evidence. 70 He certainly did not attempt to justify it in 
terms of the privacy-oriented concerns that he had proclaimed to 
be central to the fourth amendment. 
lit was not until Warden v. Hayden,11 decided one year after 
Schmerber, that Justice Brennan approached the fourth amendment 
question in terms of a fundamental right to privacy. Various items 
of clothing, seized by police in "hot pursuit" of a robbery suspect, 
were admitted at Hayden's trial to identify him as the thief. Follow-
ing his conviction, Hayden sought habeas corpus relief on the 
sions, the Court rejected the claim that these practices were repugnant to the fifth 
amendment; in both cases the Court reasoned that the procedures do not compel thr. 
production of "testimonial" evidence. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in 
each case. In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar sub-
poenaed by grand jury), and United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwrit-
ing exemplar subpoenaed by grand jury), the Court added that the compulsion to 
produce the exemplars does not offend the fourth amendment because an h;idividual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the characteristics of his voice or 
handwriting. 
Although this lack of an expectation of privacy in the evidence seized-the real 
distinction between the seizure of these exemplars and the seizure of a man's private 
papers-might bear on the validity of a fourth amendment claim, it is logically irrele-
vant to a fifth amendment claim. Thus, even though the fourth amendment might 
not prohibit these practices, the fifth amendment could. See note 122 infra and ac-
companying text. 
69. 384 U.S. at 775. 
70. Justice Brennan conceded that drawing blood constituted a "search and 
seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 384 U.S. at 769-70. But he 
distinguished cases involving intrusions into "houses, papers, and effects," such as 
Boyd and Gouled, from the instant case. 384 U.S. at 767-68. The former involved 
governmental interference with property relationships, while the latter was an in-
trusion into the defendant's person. Accordingly, in the instant case the Court was 
writing "on a clean slate." 384 U.S. at 768. Although this analysis arguably suffices 
to explain why the Court chose not to apply the traditional property analysis, it does 
not even begin to explain the leap in reasoning from the holding that Schmerber's 
blood was not "testimonial" evidence-a fifth amendment issue-to the conclusion 
that its seizure did not violate the fourth amendment. It seems that Justice Brennan 
drew this inference on the basis of his belief that, due to the "intimate relation" be-
tween the two amendments, the scope of the fourth is defined in this context by the 
scope of the fifth. 
71. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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ground that the seizure and admission of this "mere evidence" was un-
constitutional. In upholding the conviction, the Court, through Jus-
tice Brennan, reexamined and expressly repudiated the mere evi-
dence rule on two distinct grounds. First, Justice Brennan main-
tained that the rule bore no real relation to the protection of privacy, 
which the entire Court now viewed as the essence of the fourth 
amendment. 72 He observed that 
[p]rivacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evi-
dentiary object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, 
fruit, or contraband. . . . Moreover, nothing in the nature of property 
seized as evidence renders it more private than property seized, for 
example, as an instrumentality; quite the opposite may be true. In-
deed, the distinction is wholly irrational, since, depending on the cir-
cumstances, the same "papers and effects" may be "mere evidence" 
in one case and "instrumentality" in another.73 
Furthermore, Justice Brennan recognized that the rule "has spawned 
exceptions so numerous and confusion so great, in fact, that it is 
questionable whether it affords meaningful protection"u to privacy 
at all. 
Second, Justice Brennan determined that the original raisons 
d'etre for the rule were no longer compelling. 75 Since Silverman 
v. United States76 and Schmerber--which Justice Brennan now ac-
knowledged had disregarded the mere evidence rule77-had over-
thrown the traditional rule that "a lawful seizure presupposed a supe-
rior claim, "78 the true owner of seized property could recover it after 
the trial. Thus, the rule was no longer necessary to protect property 
rights. Moreover, Justice Brennan asserted that the exclusionary 
rule-which renders unconstitutionally seized evidence inadmissible 
in a criminal prosecution-now provided a sufficient remedy against 
official conduct violative of an individual's fourth amendment 
12. But see Justice Douglas' dissent: 
That there is a zone that no police can enter-whether in "hot pursuit" or 
armed with a meticulously proper warrant-has been emphasized by Boyd and 
by Gouled. They have been consistently and continuously approved. I would 
adhere to them and leave with the individual the choice of opening his private 
effects (apart from contraband and the like) to the police or keeping their 
contents a secret and their integrity inviolate. The existence of that choice is 
the very essence of the right to privacy. Without it the Fourth Amendment 
and the Fifth are ready instruments for the police state that the Framers sought 
to avoid. 
387 U.S. at 325 (footnote omitted). 
73. 387 U.S. at 301-02. 
74. 387 U.S. at 309. 
75. 387 U.S. at 303-08. 
76. 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (warrantless use of electronic listening device inserted 
into party wall is unconstitutional regardless of whether technical trespass occurred). 
77. 387 U.S. at 301 n.8. 
78. 387 U.S. at 304. 
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rights. 79 Accordingly, the majority rejected the mere evidence rule 
without ever facing dissenting Justice Douglas' contention that, as 
a matter of historical fact, the rule was constitutionally mandated. 
At first glance, it might seem that the Court was now completely 
opposed to the position, espoused by Justice Douglas in his dissent 
in Warden v. Hayden, 80 that the unreasonable search clause guaran-
teed to the individual the right to keep at least s0me types of prop-
erty absolutely beyond the reach of the government. Justice Bren-
nan noted that Hayden's clothing was not "testimonial" or "commu-
nicative," however, and thus its introduction into evidence did not 
compel him to become a witness against himself in violation of the 
fifth amendment. "[W]hether there are items of evidential value 
whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reason-
able search and seizure"81 remained an open question Thus, al-
though the Hayden majority rejected the broad basis for the decision 
in Gouled, the Court appeared to leave the paper-search rule estab-
lished in Boyd intact. Indeed, the communicative-evidence rule 
promised to offer even greater protection for private papers than had 
the original Boyd rule, since the Court now rejected the view that 
the constitutionality of seizures of evidence was controlled by prop-
erty fights. But, at the same time, Justice Brennan's opinion cast 
doubt on the continued vitality of the Boyd rule. Insofar as the dis-
tinction drawn in Schmerber between testimonial and real evidence 
could not be. rationalized in terms of privacy considerations, the 
promise held out in that case's majority opinion was empty. None-
theless, the Court in Hayden did appear to suggest ~at it would rec-
ognize and protect an inviolable zone of personal privacy. That illu-
sion was dispelled in Katz v. United States,82 a decision which has 
appropriately been described as "one step forward, one step back."88 
Since Silverman, 84 the Court had moved slowly but persistently 
in applying its right-to-privacy interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment to the law of electronic surveillance. Contrary to Olmstead,8G 
Wong Sun v. United States86 implied that speech could be "seized" 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Subsequently, Berger 
79. 387 U.S. at 307. 
80. See note 72 supra. 
81. 387 U.S. at 303 . 
. 82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
83. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case 
in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 172 (1969). This controversial article con-
tains a more thorough discussion of the problems unique to electronic surveillance 
than is appropriate here. In addition, see Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping 
Probl~m: A Professors View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 891 (1960). 
84. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), discussed in note 76 supra. 
85. Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928), discussed in text at notes 
52-56 supra. 
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v. United States81 held that wiretapping constituted a search and sei-
zure subject to the restraints of the fourth amendment. But the 
Court had not yet fully liberated its thinking about electronic surveil-
lance from the lingering influence of old beliefs about the fourth 
amendment. Even in Berger, it still clung to the property-oriented . 
notion that speech is protected only within "constitutionally protected 
areas."88 Thus, further modification was required to bring the law 
of electronic surveillance into line with the rest of the "new" fourth 
amendment law. This harmonization was accomplished in Katz. 
Katz had been convicted of transmitting wagering information 
by telephone in violation of a federal statute. At trial, the govern-
ment introduced evidence obtained through use of a monitoring device 
that FBI agents had attached to the outside wall of the public telephone 
booth that Katz had frequented. Rejecting once and for all the view 
that a fourth amendment violation occurs only when the government 
trespasses into a traditionally "constitutionally protected area," the 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Court brought the 
electronic surveillance cases back into the mainstream of fourth 
amendment law by holding that "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places. "89 
But, at the same time, the Court radically altered its basic fourth 
amendment theory in two ways. First, it reduced the scope of the 
amendment's protection by limiting the interest it protected. Justice 
Stewart, writing for the Court, explained that "what a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not 
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected."90 Justice Harlan, whose concur-
ring opinion in Katz has been accorded great weight, 91 offered his 
interpretation of the new fourth amendment standard: 
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places." The question, however, is what protection it affords 
to those people. . . . My understanding of the rule . . . is that 
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reason-
able. "92 
86. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (verbal communication protected by fourth amend-
ment). 
87. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
88. 388 U.S. at 59. 
89. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
90. 389 U.S. at 351-52 (emphasis added). 
91. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
92. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan later questioned 
this analysis in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971) (Harlan, J., dis-
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This analysis was a retreat from accepted legal principles.98 Al-
though it arguably justified the decisions in the cases involving or-
ganizational and required records, the Court had never before sug-
gested that any incriminating document was subject to seizure if its 
owner simply had failed to maintain a sufficient expectation of privacy 
with regard to it.94 Indeed, Justice Harlan's analysis was inimical to 
the premise underlying Boyd and Schmerber95-that the fourth 
amendment is intimately related to the fifth. These lines of thought 
are necessarily incompatible. Because the protection afforded 
by the fifth amendment is absolute, a court subscribing to the princi-
ples underlying Boyd would be logically compelled to conclude that 
even an individual who had told his entire neighborhood that he 
possessed papers proving him guilty of a crime had not relinquished 
his right to prevent their seizure and use as evidence against him. 00 In 
indicating that the Court would now arrive at the contrary conclusion, 
Katz revealed that the majority of Justices no longer believed that the 
two amendments were intimately related. 
In redefining the very nature of fourth amendment protection 
as well as the interests protected, Katz made a second major break 
with the past. If the determination that eavesdropping without a 
trespassory invasion could constitute a search and seizure had been 
made prior to Schmerber and Hayden, it is clear how the Court 
would have decided Katz. If the government had a cognizable claim 
:to the words seized, the Court would have held the search and seizure 
unreasonable on the ground that it had been conducted without a 
warrant. But if the government had no such claim, as was the case 
in Katz, the Court would have held the search and seizure unrea-
sonable per se. 97 
Even under Schmerber and Hayden, the search could have been 
declared unreasonable per se. Indeed, in leaving open the possibil-
ity that the constitutional significance of the distinction between 
"testimonial" and "real" evidence recognized in Schmerber would 
survive the death of the mere evidence rule, Hayden had indicated 
senting). For a critical analysis of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, 
see Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH, L. 
REV. 154 (1977). 
93. In Boyd, for example, the seized document was an invoice belonging to a 
business partnership, rather than a private document. 
94. Perlman.v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), discussed in notes 50-51 supra 
and accompanying text, is consistent with this assertion because the defendant had 
both relinquished custody of his papers and publicized them by introduction into 
the court record. 
95. See text at note 64 supra; note 70 supra. 
96. See note 122 infra. 
91. Compare Spritzer, supra note 83, with Kamisar, supra note 83. To bring 
the conversation in Katz under the instrumentalities exception would have been to 
allow the exception to swallow up the mere evidence rule. 
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that some area of absolute protection, albeit narrow, would be pre-
served. Because Katz's words were "testimonial," they should have 
fallen within that area. 
Instead, the Katz Court suggested that the only constitutional de-
ficiency of the eavesdropping was the agents' failure to obtain a war-
rant. 98 The implication was that once probable cause is established, 
a valid warrant can be issued in any case. Thus, in substituting rea-
sonable expectations of privacy for property rights as the focus of 
.fourth amendment protection, the Court was not substituting one 
inviolable interest for another. It appears that the Court now believed 
that the sole function of that amendment is to ensure that privacy is 
not invaded in an arbitrary manner, rather than to ensure that privacy 
receives absolute protection against invasion. 
Thus, in rejecting the notion that the fourth and fifth amend-
ments are "intimately related," the Court in Katz also rejected the 
notion that the fourth amendment protects an inviolable zone· of per-
sonal privacy.99 But although the Court eschewed the absolutist 
view advanced in Boyd, discussion of that case was conspicuously 
absent from all of the opinions filed in Katz.100 This omission was 
remarkable in that Katz was the case in which the Court sought to 
give full expression to the revision of fourth amendment law that had 
begun with Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead. Yet the question 
left open in Hayden-whether an inviolable zone of privacy existed 
-.formally remained open after Katz. 
IV. THE REJECTION OF AN ABSOLUTE 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
A. Deja Vu: Narrowing the Boyd Right to Privacy 
As the 1960s came to an end, Boyd was in full retreat. After 
a ''law and order'' President took office and appointed four new 
members to the Supreme Court, the question became when, rather 
than whether, Boyd would finally be overruled. The Burger Court's 
initial moves in this area were cautious. It avoided a frontal attack 
on the decision, contenting itself with confining Boyd within its 
"proper" bounds. 
Couch v. United States101 presented the first opportunity for the 
Burger Court to apply the law that had developed since Schmerber 
to a seizure of documents. Couch, the sole proprietress of a res-
98. See 389 U.S. at 354. 
99. The immunity doctrine imposed another restriction on the constitutional 
protection of personal privacy. See note 20 supra. 
100. Boyd was mentioned only in Justice Black's dissenting opinion, as part of a 
quotation from Olmstead. See 389 U.S. at 368 (dissenting opinion). 
101. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). 
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taurant, was under investigation by the IRS for possible tax fraud. 
After giving her Miranda warnings, an IRS agent issued a summons 
1
to her accountant to produce all of Couch's financial and tax records 
in his possession. In response, the accountant turned the documents 
over to Couch's attorney. When the agent petitioned the district 
court to enforce the summons, Couch intervened. 
Couch argued that, under Boyd, the government could not seize 
incriminating documents from a third party who had obtained them 
as a result of his confidential relationship with their owner. She 
claimed that such a seizure would render the owner the unwilling 
source of self-incriminating evidence.102 
The Court, through Justice Powell, responded with a confusing 
opinion.103 At the heart of its reasoning lay the judgment, which 
had been latent in Katz, that the fourth and fifth amendments are 
basically unrelated. Despite broad language to the effect that pri-
vacy is one of the values protected by the fifth amendment as well 
as by the fourth, 104 the Court ultimately concluded that the amend-
ments do not operate in tandem to safeguard some fundamental 
right. Rather, the privilege against self-incrimination was designed 
to prevent the state from extorting testimony from an accused per-
son, whereas the fourth amendment was designed to provide a pro-
cedural protection for personal privacy. Thus, the two aspects of 
Couch's claim were treated.as distinct claims. 
The issue central to the resolution of Couch's fifth amendment 
claim was whether possession or ownership controls the scope of 
the fifth amendment privilege. Asserting that the privilege is designed 
to prevent the extortion of testimony from a defendant, the Court 
concluded that the privilege applies only when the accused him-
self is compelled to produce the evidence. Thus, because Couch 
did not possess the documents, the privilege did not protect her. 
The Court conceded that "situations may well arise where construc-
tive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so 
temporary and insignificant as to leave the compulsion upon the 
accused substantially intact."105 This exception was inapplicable, 
102. She argued that Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913), Perlman 
v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), and Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), 
were distinguishable. In Johnson, title to the records was held by a trustee, see text 
at note 37 supra. In Perlman, the defendant had relinquished either his ownership 
or his right to privacy by introducing the documents into evidence in a public judicial 
proceeding; see text at notes 50-51 supra. In Burdeau, a private citizen, rather than 
the government, had seized the documents; see note 51 supra. 
103. Cf. 409 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
fails to supply a clearly articulated basis for its holding). 
104. "By its yery nature, the privilege [against self-incrimination] is an intimate 
and personal one. It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and 
thought .... " 409 U.S. at 327. 
105. 409 U.S. at 333. 
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however, since Couch's accountant was an independent contractor.106 
Since Couch had neither actual nor constructive possession of the 
documents, her fifth amendment privilege had not been violated. 
Rather than responding to Couch's argument that the rationale under-
lying Boyd applied equally to her situation, the Court merely "dis-
tinguished" Boyd on the ground that the Boyds had both owned and 
possessed the seized invoice.107 
Couch's fourth amendment claim was quickly dismissed with a 
citation to Katz. Because she did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy with regard to records she had relinquished to her ac-
countant and because the summons was technically proper, the sei-
zure was deemed constitutional.108 But the case can be read as sug-
gesting that the same result would have been reached even if Couch 
had had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Bellis v. United States109 provided the Court with an opportunity 
to reexamine the prior cases concerning organizational documents 
in light of the recent developments in fifth amendment law. A fed-
eral grand jury investigating Bellis' personal tax fraud liability sub-
poenaed him to produce the financial records of a dissolved law part-
nership of which he had been a member. Justice Marshall, writing 
for eight members of the Court, identified two primary policy consid-
erations that had guided modem courts in deciding cases concerning 
documentary subpoenas: protecting " 'the natural individual from 
compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal rec-
ords' "110 and protecting "an individual's right to a 'private enclave 
where he may lead a private life.' "111 
From these two policies, Justice Marshall derived a test to 
determine whether Bellis could invoke the fifth amendment privi-
lege. If the records belonged to the partnership as an entity-that 
is, if Bellis held them on behalf of the partnership-the privilege 
could not be invoked. But if they belonged to Bellis personally, 
the privilege would supply grounds for refusing to comply with the 
106. Justice Douglas protested tbat tbis approach discriminated against tbose tax-
payers who cannot afford (or do not need) a full-time accountant, because it put 
them in the position, practically speaking, of having to waive tbeir privilege against 
self-incrimination in order to attempt to comply with the complex tax laws. 409 U.S. 
at 342 n.4 (dissenting opinion). , 
107. 409 U.S. at 330. 
108. 409 U.S. at 335-36 & n.19. 
109. 417 U.S. 85 (1974). 
110. 417 U.S. at 89-90 (quoting with approval United States v. White, 322, U.S. 
694, 701 (1944) ). 
111. 417 U.S. at 91 (quoting witb approval Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 
U.S. 52, 55 ( 1964)). Other cases indicate that at this time this was in fact a guiding 
principle only for Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas. See, e.g., Couch v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), discussed in text at notes 101-08 supra, in which 
Justice Brennan concurred separately, and Justices Marshall and Douglas dissented. 
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subpoena. Applying the test to the facts of the case, the Court de-
termined that the records belonged to the partnership and, thus, that 
the enforcement of the subpoena would not violate Bellis' fifth 
amendment privilege. Furthermore, it concluded that, although the 
business records of a sole practitioner or a single proprietor or the 
personal records of any individual would be immune from subpoena 
so long as they were in that individual's possession, the privilege would 
not protect the financial records of any par.tnership, with the possible 
exception of those in which there were preexisting confidential re-
lationships between partners.112 
The implication of the Bellis decision, of course, was that Boyd 
had been incorrectly decided. Justice Marshall was reluctant to 
overrule that case because he was unwilling to hold that there are 
no documents that are totally immune from seizure. But, because 
Boyd represented an indistinguishable precedent, he could not ig-
nore it. He attempted to escape this dilemma by commenting that 
[i]t is true that the notice to produce involved in Boyd was in fact 
issued to E.A. Boyd & Sons, a partnership. . . . However, at this 
early stage in the development of our Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence, the potential significance of this fact was not observed by 
either the parties or the Court. ... We do not believe that the Court 
in Boyd can be said to have decided the issue presented today.113 
B. And Then There Were None: Limitation Becomes Elimination 
The Boyd rule had survived the rejection of the mere evidence 
rule only because the Supreme Court still shared the Boyd Court's 
common-sense judgment that forcing a person to utter incriminating 
words and extorting from him a record of the same words in written 
form are analytically indistinguishable: in either case, the State com-
pels that person to "be a witness against himself' within the meaning 
of the fifth amendment. By the October Term, 1975, however, 
the Burger Court was finally prepared to attack this judgment di-
rectly. The fatal blows were delivered in Fisher v. United States114 
and Andresen v. Maryland.115 
After interviews by IRS agents concerning possible liability un-
der the federal income tax laws, the taxpayers in Fisher116 obtained 
various records from their accountant, which they then gave to their 
attorney. The latter refused to comply with an IRS summons to pro-
duce certain records on the ground that enforcement would violate 
112. For example, a small family partnership. See 411 U.S. at 101. 
113. 417 U.S. at 95 n.2. 
114. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
115. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). 
116. Fisher was consolidated with United States v. Kasmir, No. 74-611. The 
facts of the two cases are substantially identical. '1n Fisher, the records related to 
the husband's textile waste business, the wife's clothing shop, and their joint tax re-
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both the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the 
attorney-client privilege. 117 The Court held that the summons could 
be validly enforced. Although Justices Brennan and Marshall justi-
fied this result on the ground that the records were not privat~118 
the majority arrived at its decision by reconsidering the nature of 
the fifth amendment. 
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice White, began by 
formally recognizing the death of the doctrine. of the "intimate rela-
tion" between the fourth and fifth amendments. The majority re-
garded these as two distinct and only incidentally related reservoirs of 
rights, the former being concerned with privacy interests and the latter 
with "the extortion of information from the accused."119 Then, on the 
authority of Couch, the Court held that the subpoena did not violate 
the taxpayers' fifth amendment. privilege, since it did not require 
them to produce the documents themselves.120 However, the Court 
recognized that where, as here, documents had been transferred to 
the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, this privilege 
could be invoked indirectly through the attorney-client privilege. 
This justification for resisting the subpoena was deemed applicable 
only where the taxpayers could have successfully invoked the fifth 
amendment privilege had they retained possession of the documents. 
Thus, the crucial question was whether the taxpayers themselves 
could have resisted a summons to produce the documents. 
At the outset, Justice White recognized that ever since Boyd the 
accepted doctrine had been that the fifth amendment prohibits the 
enforcement of a documentary subpoena against a person who would. 
be incriminated by the contents of the documents. But he claimed 
that Warden v. Hayden had so undermined the basis of this doctrine 
that it now had to be reexamined. 121 Analyzing the fifth amend-
turn. In Kasmir, they pertained to the taxpayer's medical practice and his personal 
tax return. 425 U.S. at 394 nn.2 & 3. In both cases, the subpoenaed records were 
the accountants' work products. 
117. Although the taxpayers and attorneys in Fisher and Kasmir had claimed in 
lower court proceedings that their fourth amendment rights had been violated, they 
did not press these claims before the Supreme Court. The Court stated that fourth 
amendment arguments, even if raised, would have been unsuccessful: ''The sum-
monses are narrowly drawn and seek only documents of unquestionable relevance to 
the tax investigation. Special problems of privacy which might be presented by sub-
poena of a personal diary ..• are not involved here." 425 U.S. at 40 n.7. 
118. See note 122 infra. 
119. 425 U.S. at 398 (quoting with approval Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322,328 (1973)) (emphasis added). 
120. The Court found that the taxpayers in Fisher were not in one of those situa-
tions described in Couch "where constructive possession is so clear or relinquishment 
of possession so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsion upon 
the taxpayer substantially intact." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 398. See text at note 105 
supra. 
121. Justice White failed to recognize that two distinct grounds supported the de-
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ment issue formalistically, he pointed out that the statements made 
in the documents were not compelled, because the taxpayers had 
not been under compulsion at the time they made the statements. 
Thus, the subpoenas would compel the taxpayers to commit only one 
act-producing the papers. He concluded that the privilege against 
self-incrimination is violated only when the compelled act itself con-
stitutes an incriminating communication, thus rejecting the tradi-
tional view that the incriminating character of a document's content 
is the primary factor in determining whether the privilege is violated 
by a documentary subpoena. Because the government already knew 
that these records existed and were in the taxpayers' hands, Justice 
White ruled that the implied admission of these facts inherent in 
the act of producing the documents would not be "testimonial" or 
"communicative" in the constitutional sense of these terms. There-
fore, under Schmerber, enforcement of the subpoenas would not vio-
late the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege.122 
But even if the summons could be characterized ·as compelling 
the production of testimony, Justice White argued that this would 
not be incriminating testimony. The only fact to which the taxpay-
ers would be testifying was that they ~egally possessed certain papers; 
they would.not be vouching for the truth of the statements contained 
in the papers. Thus, the Court concluded that the taxpayers could 
not invoke the fifth amendment privilege, either directly through a 
fifth amendment challenge or indirectly through the attorney-client 
privilege. 
cision in Boyd that the admission of the invoice violated the fifth amendment. One 
ground was that the invoice had been obtained in violation of the unreasonable search 
· clause of the fourth amendment. The other ground was that, by giving the Boyds 
a choice between complying with the notice to produce the invoice and forfeiting the 
glass, the government had in fact compelled them to be witnesses against themselves. 
Hayden could not have directly affected the latter ratio decidendi. But Justice White 
proceeded as if the former had been the sole basis for the Boyd decision. See 425 
U.S. at 408-09. 
122. This position is untenable for two reasons. First, although the Court pur-
ported to find some support for this approach in the cases sustaining the compulsory 
production of voice and handwriting exemplars and subpoenas of organizational rec-
ords, see 425 U.S. at 408, those cases are in fact inapposite. The Court had approved 
of subpoenas of organizational records on the ground that neither organizations nor 
their agents were entitled to the benefits of the privilege against self-incrimination, 
and it had approved of the compulsory production of exemplars on the ground that 
their contents were not testimonial at all. Second, insofar as it was suggesting that 
the government's prior knowledge that a document existed and was possessed by a 
certain individual was relevant to the question of whether its production was "testi-
monial," the Court was interpreting the protection afforded by the fifth amendment 
as "tum[ing] on the strength of the government's case against him." 425 U.S. at 429 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The bizarre nature of this reading of the amendment be-
comes clearer if it is applied in the context of compelling oral testimony from the 
defendant during a criminal trial. Surely no one would seriously suggest that a de-
fendant could be compelled to testify orally against himself in court because he had 
not kept sufficiently silent out of court. 
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The Court in Fisher cited Berger and Katz, which had involved 
only fourth amendment claims, in support of the proposition that the 
use of an accused's written or oral communications as evidence 
against him may be constitutionally valid so long as their writing or 
utterance was not compelled. 123 Thus, it came as no surprise when 
the Court applied the Fisher reasoning to a traditional search and 
seizure in Andresen v. Maryland.124 
State government agents investigating Andresen for fraud125 had 
searched his office and seized various documents that were later in-
troduced into evidence against him. Since the search and seizure 
had been conducted pursuant to a warrant, Andresen's fifth amend-
ment claim presented the Court with the question left open in War-
den v. Hayden: "[W]hether there are items of evidential value 
whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reason-
able search and seizure."126 Recognizing that Boyd had answered 
this question in the affirmative, the Court, through Justice Black-
mun, read that case as one in which "the legal predicate of the inad-
missibility of the evidence seized was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; the unlawfulness of the search and seizure was thought 
to supply the compulsion of the accused necessary to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment."127 Because there was no fourth amendment violation 
in the instant case, it was distinguishable from Boyd.128 Further-
more, on the basis of Fisher, the requisite compulsion was absent 
from the search and seizure: the government agents had seized the 
documents from Andresen, who had not been compelled to act.129 
123. 425 U.S. at 407-08. Although the majority purported not to be considering 
personal records like diaries, 425 U.S. at 401 n.7, the rationale of the opinion is 
equally applicable to them. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual R(ghts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 497 (1977); Note, Formalism, Legal 
Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 978 (1977). But see United States v. Beattie, 541 
F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1976). Cf. In re Bernstein, 425 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Fla. 1977) 
(quashing subpoena for incriminating tape recordings in possession of witness). 
124. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). 
125. Andresen, an attorney, was charged with multiple counts of"fraud and of 
fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary, 427 U.S. at 467. 
126. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967). 
127. 427 U.S. at 472. 
128. Andresen had alleged that the seizures violated his rights under the fourth 
amendment because they exceeded the scope of the warrants, see 427 U.S. at 482, 
and because the warrants were so broad as to constitute invalid "general warrants," 
427 U.S. at 478-80. The trial court, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, and 
the United States Supreme Court all rejected these claims. 
129. The Court said: "Indeed, he [Andresen] was never required to say or to 
do anything under penalty of sanction." 427 U.S. at 476. Since Andresen would 
have been penalized if he had prevented the agents from conducting _the search and 
seizure, a more accurate description of the events might be that Andresen was com-
pelled to do nothing. But the Court was not prepared to regard this as compelled 
communication. Therefore, under the theory of "compulsion" advanced in Fisher, 
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Justice Blackmun was able to arrive at this result only by misin-
terpreting the Boyd Court's conception of the "intimate relation."130 
Far from holding that a fourth amendment violation was a legal 
predicate for the inadmissibility of the evidence, the Boyd Court 
had held that, given its understanding of the two amendments, a vio-
lation of the fourth was, by definition, a violation of the fifth. Be-
cause Justice Blackmun misinterpreted Boyd as he did and because 
he found that there was no fourth amendment violation in the instant 
case, he was spared the odious task of overruling Boyd.131 Since 
only meager precedential support existed for his position, 182 he was 
ultimately obliged to defend the decision on the pragmatic ground 
that a contrary holding would unduly hamper the State's ability to 
combat crime effectively. 
Although the Court had announced that it would answer the 
question left open in Hayden, 188 it did so by implication only. The 
it seems unlikely that the Court would have found a fifth amendment violation even 
if it had found that the warrant clause of the fourth amendment had been violated. 
Moreover, if the reasoning in Justice Black's concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961)-that the exclusionary rule is of constitutional dimensions 
because the use of evidence seized unconstitutionally from a criminal defendant vio-
lates his privilege against self-incrimination in that it renders him an involuntary wit-
ness against himself-is sound, Andresen may well herald the end of the constitu-
tional dimension of the exclusionary rule. This development would certainly please 
the proponents of "law and order" on the Court. But cf. Israel, Criminal Procedure, 
the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1402-
16 (1977) (suggesting that the Burger Court is not likely to undermine the funda-
mental protections afforded by Mapp). 
130. Justice Blackmun's distortion of Boyd is manifested by his characterization 
of its holding that seizures of documents for evidentiary use were per se repugnant 
to the privilege against self-incrimination as "dictum." 427 U.S. at 471. Although 
the order contested in that case might be more accurately have been analogized to 
a subpoena, the Boyd Court intentionally decided the case on the basis of its cate-
gorization of the proceedings as a court-ordered "seizure" of the invoice. See text 
at note 9 supra. 
131. Justice Blackmun also failed to mention the fact that Andresen in effect 
overruled the decision in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), which argu-
ably still had vitality, even after Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), insofar 
as it could be said to have involved testimonial evidence. 
132. Justice Blackmun cited Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 142 (1927), Abel 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), and Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 
(1966), as authority for his holding that a person's private papers can be seized. See 
427 U.S. at 474-75. But the support that these decisions offer is questionable. The 
Marron and Abel decisions, products of the mere evidence rule, were predicated on 
the assumption that, since the documents seized were instrumentalities by which a 
crime was being committed (records of an illegal liquor business in Marron, false 
identity papers and a coded message in the espionage case of Abel), they were not 
the parties' private papers. In Hoffa, the Court held that there was no violation of 
Hoffa's fifth amendment privilege because the defendant had freely given the infor-
mation to a police agent; Andresen, of course, did not consent to the search for and 
seizure of his documents. 
133. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 471. See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
441 n.3 (1976). 
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sole suggestion in Justice Blackmun's opinion that any category of 
communication might be inherently unseizable is found in his dis-
cussion of Hoffa v. United States. 134 There the Court implied that 
any evidence, so long as it is not a coerced confession, 135 may be 
seized if the proper procedural safeguards are followed. 
Thus, in light of Andresen and Fisher, Boyd is dead. No zone 
of privacy now exists that the government cannot enter to take an 
individual's property for the purpose of obtaining incriminating infor-
mation.136 In most cases, the zone can be entered by the issuance 
of a subpoena; in the rest, it can be breached by a search warrant. 
VI. A POSTMORTEM 
The words of the Constitution can legitimately be understood in 
many ways. Precedent and history can be used to support divergent 
readings. Ultimately, the difference between the various interpreta-
tions given to the Constitution can be traced to disagreements on 
policy. 
So it is with Boyd.131 That case reflected the belief of a majority 
of the Justices then constituting the Supreme Court that the indi-
vidual's interest in the rights that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was designed to safeguard was more important than the govern-
ment's interest in convicting criminals. The Court protected those 
rights as completely as possible, though it could have read the Consti-
tution as compelling less. At least seven members of that Court 
shared the views expressed in the Boyd opinion: 
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the 
aggravating effects of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, 
it contains their substance and essence, and effects their essential pur-
pose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and 
least repulsive form, but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices 
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be 
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close 
and literal construction of them deprives them of half their efficacy, 
and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more 
134. 385 U.S. 293 (1963). Hoffa is discussed by Justice Blackmun in 427 U.S. 
at 475. 
135. The Burger Court seems to find no conflict between the coerced confession 
rule and the required records doctrine, see text at note. 43 supra, of which it approves. 
See California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
136. The question of whether this result is consistent with the premises basic to 
cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 779 (1965), both of which establish narrow zones of privacy, is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
137. See generally Note, supra note 123. 
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in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful 
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and guard against any 
stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta princi-
piis.ias 
The Burger Court has rejected Boyd because it no longer consid-
ers those values to be paramount; it is more impressed by the govern-
ment's interest in combatting crime. In Couch, Justice Powell cap-
tured the spirit of the current Court: 
It is important, in applying constitutional principles, to interpret them 
in light of the fundamental interests of personal liberty they were 
meant to serve. Respect for these principles is eroded when they 
leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate interest of 
society in -enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenues.130 · 
Accordingly, Boyd is dead. But the Court refuses to take the 
final step of overruling it. 
Justice Brandeis once called Boyd "a case that will be remem-
bered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States."140 At least 
it deserves a decent burial. 
138. 116 U.S. at 635. 
139. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,336 (1973). 
140. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
